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ABSTRACT
Auditing is a powerful tool that provides machine operators with the mechanisms to ob-
serve, and glean insights from, generic computing systems. The information obtained by
auditing systems can be used to detect and explain suspicious activity, from fault/error
diagnosis to intrusion detection and forensics after security incidents. While such mecha-
nisms would be beneficial for Real-Time Systems (RTS), existing audit frameworks are rarely
designed for this domain. If audit mechanisms are not carefully integrated into real-time
operating systems, they can negatively impact the temporal constraints of RTS. In this pa-
per, we demonstrate how to apply commodity audit frameworks to real-time systems. We
design novel kernel-based reduction techniques that leverage the periodic, repetitive, nature
of real-time (RT) applications to aggressively reduce the costs/overheads of a system-level
auditing, viz., Linux Audit (a popular open source audit framework). This is coupled with a
rigorous analysis to understand the conflicts between the temporal requirements of RT ap-
plications and the audit subsystem. Our approach, Ellipsis , generates succinct behaviors of
RT application and retains a lossless record of process activity, enabling analysis/detection
of unexpected activity while meeting temporal constraints. Our evaluation of Ellipsis , using
ArduPilot (an open-source autopilot application suite) and synthetically generated tasksets,
demonstrates up to 93% reduction in audit event generation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The need for effective fault detection and diagnostic tools has prompted the development
of a variety of event logging frameworks for real-time operating systems, including Com-
posite OS [1, 2], QNX [3] and VxWorks [4]. As RTS become increasingly indispensable
in safety- and security-critical domains such as medical devices, autonomous vehicles, un-
manned aeronautical vehicles, manufacturing automation, electricity grids and smart cities
[5, 6, 7, 8], the need for effective and precise auditing support is only growing. Even now,
when investigating vehicle collisions and crashes, event data recorders (or black boxes) are
crucial for determining fault and liability [9, 10, 11, 12]. However, concomitant with its
explosive growth, today’s RTS have become ripe targets for sophisticated attackers [13]. Ex-
ploits in RTS can enable vehicle hijacks [14, 15], manufacturing disruption [16], IoT botnets
[17], subversion of life-saving medical devices [18] and many other devastating attacks. The
COVID-19 pandemic has further shed light on the potential damage of attacks on medical
infrastructure [19, 20]. These threats are not theoretical in nature, but active and ongoing,
as evidenced most recently by malicious attempts to take control of nuclear power, water
and electric systems throughout the United States and Europe [21].
In traditional computing systems, system auditing has proven crucial to detecting, in-
vestigating and responding to intrusions. System auditing takes place at the kernel layer
and creates a new event for every system call that is issued. Not only does this approach
take the responsibility of event logging out of the hands of the application developer, it also
provides a unified view of system activity in a way that application-specific logging simply
cannot. In particular, systems logs can be iteratively parsed into a connected graph based
on the shared dependencies of individual events, facilitating causal analysis over the his-
tory of events within a system [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28, 29, 30, 31]. This capability
is invaluable to defenders when tracing suspicious activities [32, 33, 34], to the point that
the vast majority of cyber analysts consider audit logs to be the most important resource
when investigating threats [35]. Hence, the deployment of system-level audit capabilities can
help on multiple fronts: (a) fault detection/diagnosis and (b) understanding and detecting
security events.
Unfortunately, comprehensive system auditing approaches are not widely used in RTS.
RTS logging takes place largely at the application layer [9, 10] or performs lightweight
system layer tracing for performance profiling [36]; in both cases, the information recorded
is insufficient to trace attacks because the causal links between different system entities
cannot be identified. The likely cause of this hesitance to embrace holistic system-layer
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logging is poor performance – system audit frameworks are known to impose tremendous
computational and storage overheads [37], which is incompatible with the strict temporal
requirements of many real-time applications. For instance, consider an airbag deployment
system in a modern automobile that has only 50 milliseconds to fully deploy the airbag
after it senses a collision [38]. A näıve deployment of auditing in such a system could
directly result in personal injury to passengers in the car. Furthermore, system auditing
will introduce unpredictable behaviors (say, due to the need to flush out the audit buffer
when full) and timing perturbations, not to mention priority inversions and inter-application
contentions — all of which can have significant negative impacts on the safety of the RTS.
Thus, while we are encouraged by the growing recognition of the importance of embedded
auditing [39, 40, 41] and the newfound availability of Linux Audit in the Embedded Linux
distribution [42], a practical approach to RTS auditing remains an elusive goal.
This work presents a thorough exploration of aggressive system auditing within real-
time environments. We first conduct an analysis of Linux Audit’s adherence to real-time
scheduling principles, discovering that while Audit introduces large overheads and increased
variance to each system call, it does not introduce inter-application resource contention or
priority inversion (§2). Observing that the stability and performance cost of Linux Audit
is ultimately dependent on the number of log events generated, we then set out to tailor
Linux Audit to real-time applications, carefully reducing event logging without impacting
the forensic validity of the logs. We present Ellipsis, a kernel-based log reduction framework
that leverages the predictability of real-time taskset’s execution profiles (§3). Ellipsis first
profiles tasks to produce a template of their audit footprint. At runtime, behaviors that
are consistent with this template are reduced. A task that deviates from the template
is audited with lossless fidelity. Far from being impractical, we demonstrate a synergistic
relationship between security auditing and predictable RTS workloads, faithfully auditing
suspicious activities while incurring almost no log generation during benign typical activity.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as:
• We conduct a thorough performance analysis of an exemplar commodity auditing
framework, Linux Audit, to determine its impact on real-time applications (§2). We
find that Linux Audit adds large overheads to each system call, which, if not consid-
ered in system design, would cause deadline violations in real-time applications under
audit.
• We present Ellipsis , an audit framework and reduction system that is uniquely-tailored
to real-time environments (§3). To the best of our knowledge, Ellipsis is the first RTS-
aware auditing framework and the first to exploit the well-formed nature of real-time
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tasks.
• Schedulability Analysis: to demonstrate the newfound practicality of system auditing
in RTS, we conduct a thorough schedulability analysis of Linux Audit and Ellipsis
(§4) along with an evaluation using the ArduPilot application (§5). We discover that
Ellipsis is able to collect all audit information while meeting the application’s temporal
requirements.
• Security Analysis: we conduct a detailed security analysis to demonstrate that Ellipsis
provides comparable security to Linux Audit at greatly reduced costs (§6).
To facilitate further exploration into the challenges and opportunities of RTS auditing, we
will open source Ellipsis post publication.
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CHAPTER 2: AUDIT FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS
Although it is well-established that Linux Audit can incur large computational and storage
overheads in traditional software [37], its specific impacts on RT applications are unclear.
Linux Audit not only adds additional latency to each system call as it generates log messages
but also introduces the shared global kaudit buffer whose access is coordinated using a
spinlock. These changes could potentially cause havoc on RT task sets as a result of changing
execution profiles, resource contention or priority inversion [43]. In this section, we analyze
the auditing framework’s impact on RT task sets. Log maintenance tasks are not included
in this analysis as the daemons, kauditd and auditd, that handle this run with a background
priority and cannot directly impact the higher priority RT tasks.
2.1 LINUX AUDIT FRAMEWORK
The Linux Audit system [45] provides a way to observe and analyse system activities.
While Linux Audit can be configured to monitor high-level activities such as login attempts
[44], its primary utility (and overhead) comes from tracking low-level system calls, which
is the focus of this paper. An overview of the Linux Audit architecture is presented in
Figure 2.1. When an application invokes a system call 1 , the subsequent kernel control
flow eventually traverses an audit filter hook 2 . Linux Audit examines the context
of the event and compares it to pre-configured audit rules, generates a new log event and
enqueues it in a message buffer if there is a match 3 before returning control to the system
call handler 4 and then to the application 5 . Asynchronous from this workflow, a pair
of (non-real-time) audit daemons, kauditd and auditd, that run in kernel and user spaces
respectively, empty the message buffer to user space for storage, distribution and analysis.
Because the transport of logs is asynchronous, it is possible for the kaudit buffer to overflow
if system calls occur faster than the daemon flushes to user space, creating the potential for
event loss.
2.2 EVALUATION
Setup. All measurements were conducted on 4GB Raspberry Pi 4 [46] running Linux
4.19. The kernel was sourced from raspberrypi/linux [47] with additional kconfig (CON-
FIG PREEMPT RT FULL, CONFIG AUDIT, CONFIG AUDITSYSCALL) enabled. Au-
dit rules were configured to only match against our benchmark application i.e., background
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of Linux Audit Framework [44].














Figure 2.2: Latency distribution of ex-
ecuting getpid for various auditing sce-
narios.
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Figure 2.3: Overheads of auditing dif-
ferent system calls using the RT+audit
scenario.
process activity was not audited. We borrow an aggressive audit configuration that captures
all forensically-relevant events on the system [29, 32, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52].1 Kaudit buffer
size of 50,000 was used. To isolate the baseline latency of the Linux Audit framework,
we use the getpid system call because it is non-blocking and does not require any argu-
ments. To further reduce external perturbations, we disable power management, set CPU
governor to performance [53] and direct all kernel background tasks/interrupts to core 0.
In each case the latency is measured by taking the difference of monotonic timer counter
(clock gettime(CLOCK MONOTONIC, t)) before and after the syscall. To reduce error,
the latency to read the timer values is subtracted from the syscall latency.
Temporal Analysis. We first measure the overhead added by Linux Audit when processing
an individual system call. Figure 2.2 shows the latency to execute the getpid system call
in varying conditions. Each column shows a box plot of system call execution latency over
1000 iterations. The baseline case is the latency to execute the system call with auditing
1Specifically, our ruleset audits execve, read, readv, write, writev, sendto, recvfrom, sendmsg, recvmsg, mmap,
mprotect, link, symlink, clone, fork, vfork, open, close, creat, openat, mknodat, mknod, dup, dup2, dup3,
bind, accept, accept4, connect, rename, setuid, setreuid, setresuid, chmod, fchmod, pipe, pipe2, truncate,
















Figure 2.4: Overhead of auditing the
getpid benchmark application with back-
ground stress.















Figure 2.5: Latency of a system call with
parallel executing threads.
disabled and no other application running. For the second audit scenario, auditing is enabled
and every invocation of the system call is recorded by the audit system. For the RT+audit
scenario, we execute the previous scenario with the application executing system calls under
audit but running with a RT priority. The impact of auditing on system calls that are
not included in audit rules and thus not traced eventually is shown in the filtered scenario.
In all earlier scenarios, the kaudit buffer never overflows and complete logs are captured.
lost shows the latency when kaudit buffer is full and all logs are lost. Figure 2.2 shows
auditing overhead added to every system call execution. The observed maximum overhead
was just under 100 µs. This observed max reduces to 60 µs when the application under
audit is assigned a RT priority. If a system call is excluded from audit rules or the event
log is lost due to the buffer being full, the overhead is much smaller at ≤ 1µs and ≤ 20µs,
respectively. Figure 2.3 shows the latencies (x-axis in µs) for baseline (Audited = False) and
audited (Audited = True) scenarios for different system calls. Earlier observations hold true
for different system calls.
Priority Inversion. We repeat the previous test with a non-real-time priority stress appli-
cation running in parallel. The stress application executes the same getpid workload over
4 threads, and is also audited. Figure 2.4 reports the latency of system call execution for
the main benchmark application only. Audited application running with high priority did
not suffer any additional contention from any non-real-time audited workloads being run in
parallel i.e., no priority inversions were observed in this experiment.
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Resource Contention. Linux Audit introduces a resource shared among RT tasks being
audited, the kaudit buffer, which could lead to contention and blocking. To test the presence
of contention, we repeat the earlier benchmark in which a single-threaded application issues
getpid calls. While measuring the latency of one thread, we introduce an increasing number
of additional threads running the same benchmark. The threads are synchronized via a
barrier to start executing at the same time. The benchmark has a tight loop that runs
only the getpid system call in each thread, hence ruling out the processor cache or memory
bandwidth as sources of contention. The timing variations for executing the system calls
on the thread under observation is shown in Figure 2.5. In the average case, we observe
only a small difference in the latency of getpid regardless of the parallel workloads. The
observed worst case overhead is still under 100 µs, even when all 4 cores are using the buffer
concurrently. This result intuitively follows as the shared spinlock covers a small critical
section containing pointer manipulations.
2.3 REMARKS
Encouragingly, we observe that Linux Audit does not introduce significant issues of priority
inversion or contention. Hence it is a good candidate for RTS. While contention is possible
due to the spinlock on the kaudit buffer, this cost does not impact the average latency of
auditing as the number of parallel threads increases. Further, except for a limited number
of outlier cases, the latency introduced by system calls can be measured and bounded. This
works well for latency sensitive RTS that RT Linux is intended for. However, the storage and
management of these audit logs remains a significant challenge for resource-bound devices –
for example, our brief experiments in §2.2 generated over 2 MB of audit logs in 50 ms. In
the next section, we introduce an optimization for Linux Audit that mitigates this burden.
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CHAPTER 3: ELLIPSIS
The volume of audit logs is a major limiting factor for their continued use on RTS. Re-
ducing the volume is necessary for lossless auduting on resource constrained devices and also
vastly reduces the average overhead of the Audit system [37]. In this section, we present
Ellipsis , an audit reduction technique designed specifically for RTS. Ellipsis takes advantage
of the predictive nature of RT tasks to learn templates of application behavior. Log mes-
sages are filtered at runtime if the task’s behavior adheres to the template. We now describe
templates (§3.1), our approach to template creation (§3.2) and runtime matching (§3.3).
3.1 TEMPLATES
Templates are representations of learned expected behaviors of RT tasks. They contain a
sequence of system calls and their expected arguments. Let’s say we have a single periodic
task τ which we want to audit with Ellipsis and thus first need to create templates for. RT
tasks are commonly structured with a one time init component and repeating loops. Let si
denote a system call sequence the task exhibits in a loop iteration, where 0 < i ≤ N and
N is dependent on how many different execution paths τ might take. Let function len(si)
return the number of system calls in a sequence si. Let S denote the set of all such system
call sequences that an instance of τ might exhibit, S = [s1, s2, s3...sN ]. Let’s further assume
that each sequence si has a probability of occurrence, denoted by pi.
Conjecture 3.1. N is finite for real time tasks and S can be fully determined.
Real Time tasks are developed to have limited code paths and bounded loop iterations.
Complete static analysis is an important part of worst case analysis of real time tasks.
Conjecture 3.2. The distribution of pi is highly biased i.e., certain sequences si will have
much higher probability of occurrence as compared to others.
Such repetition of certain sequences has been shown in prior works in literature [54] and
case study shown later in this work (§5). Let’s now assume that the sequences are arranged
in decreasing order of probability of occurrence i.e. p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3... ≥ pN . First n sequences
are chosen to be reduced by Ellipsis where 1 ≤ n ≤ N . Let’s say that the task τ executed for
a large number of iterations I. Let’s denote the number of events in init phase by f . Let B
denote the length in bytes of each event when stored on disk. While BEllipsis and BAudit vary
based on event types and arguments, the design of Ellipsis ensures that BEllipsis < BAudit.
8
Size on disk for the log (L) for Linux Audit (LAudit), Ellipsis (LEllipsis) and log size reduction
can thus be calculated as:
LAudit = I ∗BAudit ∗
∑N
i=1(pi ∗ len(si)) + f ∗BAudit (3.1)
LEllipsis = I ∗ (BEllipsis ∗
∑n
i=1 pi +BAudit ∗
∑N
i=n+1(pi ∗ len(si))) + f ∗BAudit (3.2)
LAudit − LEllipsis = I ∗ ( BAudit ∗
∑n
i=1(pi ∗ len(si)) − BEllipsis ∗
∑n
i=1 pi ) (3.3)
Size reduction
Iterations
Audit log size for n sequences
Ellipsis log size for n sequences
vs These log size savings come at the cost of storing the template in memory at runtime:
Runtime Memory Overhead = 36 ∗ n+ 44 ∗
∑n
i=1 len(si) (3.4)
where 36 and 44 are parameters calculated on 64 bit Linux kernel. Note that Linux Audit
and Ellipsis utilize a memory buffer, kaudit buffer (Fig. 2.1). This buffer is not considered
in Eq. 3.4 but is explored in Section 5.4. As evident from Eq. 3.3, applications with long
repeating sequences benefit most from Ellipsis . For any sequence that is not included as a
template, Ellipsis behaves identical to Linux Audit. In this work we use dynamic analysis
only to find the most frequently occurring sequences. Parameters from the detailed case
study presented in Section 5 are included in Table 3.1 as an example. Detailed templates
from the case study are provided in Appendix A.
Extended Horizon for Log Reduction. Till now we have limited the horizon of log reduction
to individual task loop instances. If the system is continually behaving within the parameters
encoded in the templates, the horizon for log reduction can be extended to multiple instances
of a task. Many contiguous instances of the task yield a single audit message which captures
(a) the start time of the first instance (b) end time of the last instance and (c) the number
of task instances reduced within this entry. The maximum number of instances that can
be reduced together is configurable and can be as assigned by the system administrator
or possibly the application hyper-period. Whenever a reduction check fails, a single log
message is generated for previously reduced instances in addition to the complete log for the
current instance. This higher performance system is henceforth referred to as Ellipsis-HP .
At worst Ellipsis-HP behaves identical to Ellipsis while in the best case where all repetitions
of a sequence happen contiguously, Ellipsis-HP will capture all sequence repetitions in one
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Table 3.1: Parameters from Case Study
Task Name N I len(si) pi f
arducopter 5 100 [14, 15, 17, 17, 18] [0.95, 0.02, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01] 679
ap-rcin 1 182 [16] [1] 2
ap-spi-0 5 1599 [1, 1, 1, 2, 2] [0.645, 0.182, 0.170, 0.001, 0.001] 0
entry.
LBestEllipsis-HP = BEllipsis ∗ n+BAudit ∗ I ∗
∑N
i=n+1(pi ∗ len(si)) + f ∗BAudit (3.5)
LAudit − LBestEllipsis-HP = BAudit ∗ I ∗
∑n
i=1(pi ∗ len(si))−BEllipsis ∗ n (3.6)
Temporal Constraint. RTS are sensitive to time intervals between events, thus, Ellipsis also
considers temporal checks in the template matching process. For Ellipsis each templatized
sequence needs to finish within a pre-determined time interval for it to be reduced at runtime.
This interval can be learned when templates are created or can be a constraint provided
by the system administrator. Ellipsis-HP adds additional checks for inter-arrival times of
different task instances. Note that the earlier discussion on log sizes assumes that temporal
constraints are always met. The impact of temporal constraints on log size reduction are
explored further in Section 5.3.
3.2 TEMPLATE CREATION
There are two stages to template creation: (a) identification of sequences of system calls
and their arguments and (b) profiling temporal behavior. Figure 3.1 provides an overview
of this automated offline processs. In the first training stage, Ellipsis captures traces over
multiple executions of the application. These traces can be obtained from a variety of
sources, e.g., strace [55] or from the audit logs themselves. To effectively delineate between
threads, our tracer implementation modifies Linux Audit to include the Thread ID in log
messages. The goal of the Ellipsis templates is to capture the cyclic system call behavior
of periodic tasks. The challenge of identifying repetitive execution behavior is actually
common in the auditing literature [49, 56, 57, 58] but past solutions require binary analysis,
code annotations, stack analysis or a combination. Instead, we observe that periodic tasks
typically end with calls to sleep or yield that translate to nanosleep and sched yield
system calls in Linux. Periodic behaviors can also be triggerd by polling timerfds to read
events from multiple timers by using select and epoll wait system calls. We leverage
these system calls to identify boundaries of task executions and then extract a sequence
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of system call invocations within each task execution. These system call sequences are
then converted into intermediate thread-level templates, each entry of which includes the
system call name along with the passed arguments. The existence or usage of boundary
syscalls is not compulsory though. We only use them to identify loops without modifying
the application. However Linux Audit supports custom audit messages that can be added
to applications. So any application can be modified to explicitly mark the start and end of
repeating loops.
This process yields the per task syscall sequences exhibited by the application and their
properties i.e. length and probability of occurrence. Based on desired log reduction vs mem-
ory tradeoff (§3.1) a subset of sequences can be chosen to create corresponding templates.
If there is a requirement to create templates for all possible valid syscall sequences, static
analysis tools can be used to enumerate all code paths and create templates accordingly. We
infer task runtimes by auditing the application using Ellipsis configured with the interme-
diate templates obtained previously. Ellipsis validates these learnt behaviors to selectively
disable log reduction for task instances that experience delays to allow for investigations.
3.3 RUNTIME MATCHING
Given the template of system call sequences that periodically occur in an application, we
designed a kernel module that extends Linux Audit to filter system calls that are described
by the Ellipsis template. We extend the Linux Audit command-line utility auditctl to
transmit template data into kernel space. The templates corresponding to an application’s
behavior are modeled as a finite state automaton (FSA) as shown in Fig 3.2. We implemented
the template matching feature to complement the system call filtering performed by Linux
Audit, thus performing log reduction down at the source of log events.
While the periodic task is executing, all system calls that are allowed by the automaton are
stored in a temporary task-specific buffer. If the set of events fully describes an automaton
template, Ellipsis discards the contents of the task-specific buffer and enqueues a single log
message onto the main kaudit buffer to denote the execution of a templatized task. However,
Ellipsis enqueues the entire task-specific buffer to the main kaudit buffer if (a) a system call
occurs that is not allowed by the automaton, (b) if the template is not fully described at the
end of the task instance or (c) if the task instance does not adhere to the expected temporal
behavior of the fully described template. Using this runtime matching routine, Ellipsis
reduces the storage overhead of each task period to a single log message, thus dramatically
improving the average case. However, if the application exhibits anomalous or suspicious























Figure 3.1: Overview of the Ellipsis template generation workflow. In the first stage the
application’s system calls are traced to identify repeating sequences. Syscalls are denoted by
S1, S2, S3. In the second stage the application is audited with Ellipsis using the intermediate
template. The second stage creates a profile for tasks execution time (∆1) using Ellipsis audit














Figure 3.2: Runtime template matching is modelled as a Finite State Automaton (FSA).
Ellipsis FSA states are numbered as x,{y} where x is the number of syscalls matched while
y is the set of templates that are reachable from this state. This example shows TPL-1 from
Fig. 3.1 and an additional TPL-2 that shares first syscall with TPL-1 but diverges by calling
S3 after first S1. Ellipsis starts in state (0,{1,2}) prior to observing system calls present in
the two configured templates. System call invocations trigger state transitions and following
the entire sequence identified by a template while satisfying temporal constraints leads to
an accept state (TPL-1,TPL-2). Any unexpected behavior causes Ellipsis to write stored
audit logs and return to the start state, as shows with the dotted transitions.
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CHAPTER 4: SCHEDULABILITY ANALYSIS
This section presents a real-time schedulability analysis for Linux Audit and Ellipsis .
The base scenario in Fig. 4.1 shows execution timeline for two periodic tasks that are not
under audit. Audit overheads can be divided into two parts: (i) A(·) represents the task
execution with additional synchronous overhead of log generation and (ii) B(·) represents the
processing time required to maintain the audit logs, transporting them from kaudit buffer to
userspace and eventually to persistent storage (Fig. 2.1). Audit log maintenance (Task B(·))
is composed of kauditd and auditd daemons that run with background priority. Task B(·)
varies with the number of log events that need to be maintained. Any additional overheads
of log maintenance, like transporting them to a remote server can also be trivially included
in this component. We now analyze the schedulability when tasks are audited.
Let us represent the WCET of each task τi as C
‘




i is the additional
(worst-case) computational time for log generation. The overhead CAi for Linux Audit has
been analysed in §2. Let us represent the taskset as Γ = {τi(CIi , Ti, Di)} Auditing would not
cause any deadline violations if the WCRT of each task τi ∈ ΓI (denoted by Ri) is less than
or equal to its deadline (Ri ≤ Di). The response time calculation, hence the schedulability
of task under audit, therefore can be obtained by standard multicore global fixed-priority
scheduling analysis techniques [59, 60] and represented by: Ri = min{x} s.t.: x ≤ CIi and∑
τk∈hp(τi) I
k
i (x) < M(x−CIi ), where hp(τi) represents the set of tasks with a priority higher
than τi and I
k
i (·) is the interference experienced by τi from a higher-priority task τk.
Recall that the audit buffer is filled by the real-time tasks at runtime and needs to be
periodically cleared and saved in persistent storage. Task B(·) responsible for this behaves
similar to garbage collectors that have been studied in prior works in literature [61]. We
assume that the buffer is large enough to hold logs before consecutive invocations of the
buffer draining task (see §5.4 for further analysis on buffer usage). We further assume that
the buffer draining mechanism executes with the lowest priority (i.e., it does not interfere
with the existing real-time tasks). Let us now consider the augmented taskset Γ ∪ {τB}
where the task τB is responsible for draining the logs in audit buffer to the user space audit
daemon (kauditd) and any post processing including persistent storage of the log (auditd).
Recall that by assumption the buffer is large enough to hold logs for one hyperperiod. The
hyperperiod is the least common multiple (LCM) of the periods of each task τi ∈ Γ and
we denote this as LCM(Γ). The buffer draining mechanism will be invoked once in each
hyperperiod, i.e., TB = LCM(Γ) and needs to complete its execution before its next periodic
interval (i.e., DB = TB). We can audit this system (i.e., there will be no log loss) if the
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B(T1 + T2) < B(T1) + B(T2)
Figure 4.1: Sample timelines for two periodic tasks τ1 and τ2. A(·) is the increased compu-
tation time of the task including audit log generation overhead. B(·) represents the runtime
of kauditd and auditd daemons as they handle the logs generated by the real-time tasks.
WCRT of the buffer draining task is less than its p iod, i. ., RB ≤ TB. We assume here
that τB is the only background task in the system. However, if other such tasks exist their
interference can be accounted for.
Let us now consider a window of length x (e.g., a time interval [t1, t2) such that t1 is the
arrival time of a job of τB, t2 is a generic value less than or equal to t1 +TB and x = t2− t1).
I iB(x) is the interference from a higher-priority real-time task τi within the window x —
this is the cumulative time in which the buffer draining task can not execute because of
the execution of τi. Note that τB cannot execute during the collection of intervals when
all M cores are occupied by the real-time tasks. The cumulative length1 of this interval is









B(x) represents the total interference
from real-time tasks. Let us assume that there exists a function RB(·) that returns the
minimum value of x with following schedulability conditions:
x ≥ CB and
∑
τi∈Γ
I iB(x) < M(x− CB), (4.1)
i.e., RB(·) = min{x} if Eq. (4.1) holds; otherwise RB(·) = ∞. By definition the value
of RB(·) is also an upper bound for the WCRT of τB and the calculation of the functions
I iB(x) and RB(·) can be obtained by standard global multicore scheduling analysis [59, 60].
The logging mechanism therefore will work as expected if the following conditions hold:
RB(·) ≤ TB = LCM(ΓII) and Ri ≤ Di,∀τi ∈ ΓII. However, if RB(·) > TB the accumulation
of logs in buffer would eventually lead to RB(·) =∞, overflowing the buffer.
4.1 SYNTHETIC WORKLOAD
Experiment. To study the impact of auditing we perform a schedulability and auditing
experiment, comparing Linux Audit and Ellipsis-HP . Tasksets (Γ) consist of upto 5 tasks
1This total interval length x− CB may not necessarily be contiguous.
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Figure 4.2: Temporal and Auditing constraint analysis for periodic tasksets. Taskset utiliza-
tion (X axis) are plotted against the percentage of tasksets (Y-axis) for which All Deadlines
are Met (ADM) or have Zero Log Loss (ZLL). Tasks have 5% system call and 95% non-system
call workload. The shaded region shows the area where both ADM and ZLL requirements
are satisfied. The schedulability or ADM for Unaudited case is provided as a reference.
(τ) with utilization chosen uniformly ∈ [0, 1]. Tasks have a period ∈ [100, 1000]µs and have
a utilization selected using UUniFast algorithm [63]. Each task’s computation time is di-
vided into 95% busy wait and 5% audited syscalls. The syscalls are ∈ [getpid, getppid,
getgid32, getuid32, getpgrp]. These syscalls were chosen for their stable execution pro-
files. However their small execution time means that the synchronous overhead component
A(·) disproportionately impacts them. The evaluation setup as described in Sec 2.2 is used.
Additionally, tasks are isolated to core 1, while interrupts and kernel processes (including
kauditd) run on core 0. Other cores are disabled. The audit buffer is set to be large enough
to hold exactly one hyperperiod worth of audit information. All tasks are started together
and each τi runs for 2 × LCM(Γ)/Ti iterations. Tasks are executed with rate monotonic
priority. This ensures that if the second hyperperiod of the taskset starts with some audit
logs in kaudit buffer from the previous hyperperiod, log loss will occur. For each taskset we
monitor whether all tasks meet their temporal requirement i.e., All Deadlines Met (ADM).
We also monitor whether any audit logs are lost i.e., Zero Log Loss (ZLL). 1000 tasksets
are run, the results for tasksets are grouped together by utilization in groups of 0.1. Y axis
measures fraction of the tasksets in each group for which all deadlines were met (ADM) and
zero logs were lost (ZLL).
Observations. Figure 4.2 shows the results. The synchronous A(·) component impacts
ADM. Ellipsis-HP performs better on ADM metric allowing all tasksets with upto 0.3 uti-
lization to meet all deadlines whereas Linux Audit sees deadlines miss starting at 0.3 uti-
lization. The main point of difference is the B(·) component that deals with maintenance of
auditing information; log loss occurs when this component does not get enough computation
time. Linux Audit starts experiencing log loss at very small utilizations. When deadlines
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are missed, the total runtime of the taskset goes beyond 2 hyperperiods but Linux Audit is
unable to avoid log loss despite the additional time. In stark contrast, Ellipsis-HP is able
to achieve lossless auditing for all workloads.
Discussion. Although Linux Audit has been included in embedded Linux its impact on
schedulability of real time tasksets requires careful analysis. In this experiment, despite the
low ratio of the task workload being audited (5%), Linux Audit is able to meet deadlines
for all tasksets with utilization upto 0.2 only. This is the trade-off for the security benefits
of auditing. Surprisingly, Linux Audit starts seeing loss of auditing information as taskset
utilization goes above 0.1. Ellipsis-HP improves this significantly by satisfying both ADM
and ZLL requirements for tasksets of upto 0.3 utilization. Section 5.5 further explores these
overheads for an autopilot application.
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CHAPTER 5: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
ArduPilot is an open source autopilot application that can fully control various classes
of autonomous vehicles such as quadcopters, rovers, submarines and fixed wing planes [64].
It has been installed in over a million vehicles and has been the basis for many industrial
and academic projects. We chose the quadcopter variant of ArduPilot as it has the most
stringent temporal requirements within the application suite. All evaluations are conducted
on the setup described in Sec. 2.2. A Navio2 module board containing intertial sensors
required by ArduPilot was attached on the Raspberry Pi board. The kaudit buffer size was
set to 50K as it was found to be the highest stable configuration possible for the evaluation
platform. Among the seven tasks spawned by Copter, we focus primarily on a task named
Fast Loop for evaluating temporal overheads as it includes the Copter stability and control
tasks that need to run at a high frequency to keep the QaudCopter stable and safe.
Among the system calls observed in the trace of Copter, we found that only a small subset
of system calls were relevant to forensic analysis [48], viz., execve, openat, read, write,
close and pread64. Upon running the template generation script on the application binary,
we obtained templates for three tasks consisting of 14 write, 16 pread64 calls and 1 read call,
respectively. These templates include expected values corresponding to the file descriptor
and count arguments of the system calls as well as temporal constraints. Templates were
loaded into the kernel before we evaluated Ellipsis or Ellipsis-HP . Linux Audit was set up to
capture invocations of the system calls made by the Copter application as mentioned above.
Complete templates are provided in Appendix A.
5.1 AUDIT COMPLETENESS
Experiment. We first evaluate whether complete audit information can be captured for
this application. We ran the application for 100K iterations for task frequencies of 100, 200,
300 and 400 Hz as defined in the application source code.
Observations. Fig. 5.1 compares the logs lost count for Linux Audit, Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP
across multiple task frequencies. We observe that Linux Audit is unable to provide lossless
auditing for the desired application periodic frequency of 400 Hz. Only when the application
frequency was lowered to 100 Hz could Linux Audit capture complete logs.
Discussion. This task performs critical stability and control function so reducing the task
frequency to accommodate auditing can have catastrophic results. On the other hand, there
is no need for such a trade off with Ellipsis as it can provide lossless auditing for the entire
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Figure 5.1: Number of audit logs lost for various frequencies of the primary periodic loop in
the ArduPilot application over 100K iterations.
range of application frequencies, as shown in Figure 5.1.
To explore the trade-off of audit completeness vs an application’s temporal requirements,
the task was run again at 400 Hz. Auditing was allowed to insert waits whenever the kaudit
buffer is full by utilizing a configuration provided by Linux Audit, audit set backlog wait time.
These waits did allow Linux Audit to log all audit information but led to missed deadlines.
Hence, Linux Audit would force a trade-off between ArduCopter’s temporal requirements
and lossless auditing, whereas Ellipsis achieves both.
5.2 AUDIT LOG REDUCTION
Experiment. For measuring the volume of audit logs written to disk, we ran the application
over multiple iterations in 10 to 100K range to simulate application behavior over varying
runtimes. Figure 5.2 compares the storage costs in terms of log files size on disk in bytes.
Observations. The storage costs for all systems over shorter runs was found to be compa-
rable, as the cost of auditing the initialization phase of the application tends to dominate
over the periodic behavior of tasks. Over a 250 second runtime the growth of logs in Ellipsis
was drastically lower compared to vanilla Linux Audit, with storage costs reducing by 740
MB, or 80%, when using Ellipsis . Ellipsis-HP provides a more aggressive log reduction
option by lowering storage costs by 860MB, or 93%, compared to Linux Audit. Linux Audit
Lossless estimates the log size had there been no log loss.
Discussion. The observations line up with our initial hypothesis that the bulk of the audit
logs generated during a loop iteration would exactly match the templates. Thus, in Ellipsis
by reducing all the log messages that correspond to a template down to a single message,
we see a vast reduction in storage costs while ensuring the retention of all the audit data.
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Figure 5.2: Total size of the audit log, as
size on disk (Y-axis), captured for differ-




































Figure 5.3: Log size (Y-axis left) un-
der varying temporal constraint policies.
The right Y axis shows the % reduction in
log size compared to Linux Audit (§5.2).
µ + 4σ covers 99.5% of the total 100k it-
erations.
Ellipsis-HP takes this idea further by eliminating audit log generation over extended periods
of time if the application exhibits expected behaviors only. For RTS that are expected to
run for months or even years without failing, these savings are crucial for both longevity of
the system and reducing the performance costs.
5.3 TEMPORAL CONSTRAINT POLICY
Experiment. In this experiment we explore the impact of different policies for temporal
constraints. As described in Chapter 3, temporal constraints are applied, intra-task, for
Ellipsis and additionally inter-task for Ellipsis-HP . While the constraint values on expected
runtimes and expected inter-arrival times of task instances are learned and applied separately
for each task, a common policy can be enforced. For example the policy max implies that
all timing constraints are set to the maximum value that was observed for them during
the learning phase. The max policy is used in all other experiments in this section. Other
policies explored in this experiment are based on the average (µ) and standard deviation
(σ) of the time intervals observed during the learning phase. The none policy disables all
temporal constraints and represents the best case in this experiment.
Observations. Fig. 5.3 shows the impact of different temporal constraint policies on log
size. With more stringent timing constraints, fewer task instances are observed to adhere to
constraints leading to an increase in log size. max and none policy yield the same log size,
which is expected given that temporal determinism is a design feature of RT applications.
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Linux Audit Ellipsis Ellipsis-HP
Figure 5.4: Audit buffer utilization over
time. Additional red annotations signify
all times where buffer is completely filled.
Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP did not use more
than 2% buffer space.



















Figure 5.5: Comparison of runtime over-
heads. Task period and deadline is 2500
µs.
Discussion. The timing constraints are decided based on the observed values from the
learning phase. Learning phase behavior is considered correct as this phase is a controlled
execution. Hence we believe that Ellipsis should be used at runtime to record unexpected
behaviors i.e. not seen during learning phase while eliminating audit logs for all expected
behaviors. The policies max and µ+ 4σ most closely correspond with this recommendation.
Further is it notable that since max and none policy yield almost the same log size, under
normal operation, the max constraint comes with negligible overheads.
5.4 AUDIT BUFFER UTILIZATION
Experiment. The kaudit buffer state was sampled periodically, once every 2 seconds, by
querying the audit command-line utility auditctl during the execution of the application for
100K iterations. Figure 5.4 shows the comparison of the percentage utilization of the audit
buffer by Linux Audit, Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP over time.
Observations. From Fig. 5.4, we see that for Linux Audit, the utilization of the kaudit
buffer rises quickly and remains close to 100% for the majority of the running time, resulting
in loss of audit messages as measured earlier (§5.1). In contrast, Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP
ensure that the buffer utilization remains negligible throughout the execution.
Discussion. When the kaudit buffer is full, new audit messages are lost; hence, to ensure
that suspicious events are recorded, it is essential that the buffer is never full. Ellipsis
is able to keep the buffer from overflowing by reducing the number of audit logs being
generated and thus reducing the number of outstanding audit logs buffered in the system.
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The variations that we see in the plots can be attributed to the scheduling of the non
real-time kauditd thread that is responsible for sending the outstanding audit messages to
user-space for retention on disk. We observe that the backlog builds with time when kauditd
isn’t scheduled and drops sharply when kauditd eventually gets CPU time.
However there are two limitations to using auditctl to estimate memory usage. First,
kaudit buffer size does not consider the additional memory used by Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP
to maintain templates in memory and perform runtime matching. Manual calculations
yielded a memory overhead of less than 100 KB, or 1 % of the buffer size. Second, the
relatively slow sampling rate of 0.5 Hz can miss transient changes in buffer utilization.
auditctl reports buffer occupancy at the moment it is invoked. However, running auditctl
at a higher frequency leads to changes in application profile. So we ran further experiments
to determine the minimum kaudit buffer size with which Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP can still
achieve complete auditing. These further experiments are free from any sampling limitation.
We find that a buffer of 2.5K for Ellipsis and 1.5K for Ellipsis-HP was enough to support
lossless auditing. This reduced memory requirement is valuable for RTS that run on resource
constrained platforms. The reduced time that the buffer holds audit logs, reduces the attack
window for recently identified race condition attacks on the audit buffer [65].
5.5 RUNTIME OVERHEADS
Experiment. Finally, we measure the runtime overheads. Figure 5.5 shows the execution
time in microseconds, for the Fast Loop task of Copter under various conditions. The
execution time for each scenario was measured by running the task for 1000 iterations with
a kaudit buffer size of 50K to facilitate collection of all audit logs. The measurement is
based on the monotonic timer counter. This process was repeated 100 times to capture the
distribution of these measurements over longer application runs. Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP
refers to the normal execution of the application with their respective reduction techniques.
In Ellipsis NR (No Reduction), we instrumented the template to force the reductions to
always fail, due to a forced mismatch at the very last entry in the template. In this extreme,
synthetic scenario, Ellipsis is forced to do the longest possible match before eventually failing
to reduce the log. When all reductions fail, Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP are equivalent and hence
Ellipsis NR is the worst case scenario for both systems.
Observations. Ellipsis , Ellipsis-HP and Ellipsis NR have nearly the same overhead as
Linux Audit. On average, Ellipsis ’s overhead is 0.93 x and Ellipsis-HP ’s overhead is 0.90 x
of Linux Audit. Ellipsis NR shows an 1.05 x increase in average overhead compared to Linux
Audit. The observed maximum overheads show a greater improvement. Ellipsis ’s observed
21
maximum overhead is 0.87 x and Ellipsis-HP ’s observed maximum overhead is 0.70 x of
Linux Audit. Ellipsis NR shows an 1.07 x increase in maximum observed overhead.
Discussion. When audit logs are successfully reduced by Ellipsis , the total work done
to collect audit information is reduced. This in turn reduces the overhead of auditing. This
effect is further amplified in Ellipsis-HP owing to its greater log reduction potential (§5.2).
However, when the reduction fails, there is a small increase in overhead due to the extra
comparative checks done to determine whether the logs can be reduced validly. This effect
is visible in the Ellipsis NR case where all reduction attempts are instrumented to fail. For
any application the actual runtime overhead change will depend on what proportion of the
audit information is reducible. However, as evident from Ellipsis NR the worst case of no
reduction is still not significantly worse than Linux Audit.
5.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Ellipsis provides complete audit log retention while meeting temporal requirement of the
ArduPilot application, using minimal memory and without any significant increase in the
overhead of auditing. Ellipsis-HP further improves this by increasing the log reduction ratio.
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CHAPTER 6: SECURITY ANALYSIS
We adopt a threat model similar to that used in related work [32, 66, 67, 68, 69], i.e., we
include the underlying OS and the audit subsystem in the trusted computing base (TCB). We
focus on attackers that aim to exfiltrate sensitive data from or degrade the performance of RT
systems. For example, an attacker may install modified target programs, exploit a running
process or install malware on the target system to achieve their objectives. Additionally, we
require that attacks leverage syscalls so that they can be observed by the audit subsystem.
Further, we assume that attackers cannot compromise the integrity of audit logs. Although
audit integrity is an important security goal, it is orthogonal to our objectives and can be
enabled by building upon existing secure auditing frameworks [50]. Applications are assumed
to be benign during the offline Ellipsis training phase. Target applications are the only
processes of interest running on the system and are the only processes audited by the audit
subsystem. Specifically, we leverage an aggressive audit configuration identified in prior work
that is intended to capture all forensically-relevant events [29, 32, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52].1
6.1 DATA EXFILTRATION ATTACK
To demonstrate that Ellipsis retains critical forensic information in lossless fidelity while
reducing benign application behavior, we reproduce a data exfiltration attack on Motion [70],
an open-source video surveillance application that was presented in prior work [54].
Attack Scenario Motion [70] monitors camera images and detects motion by tracking
changes between image frames. It is used for surveillance and can be configured to capture
video or still images when motion is detected. The application contains a main loop that
captures an image frame and saves it to a user configured location on detecting motion.
In this attack, the attacker inserts malicious code shown in Fig. 6.1 into the target ap-
plication to save image frames to an attacker controlled location when motion is detected.
The attacker can exploit another process running on the system in order to exfiltrate these
sensitive images out of the system at a later point in time. Fig. 6.2 visualizes the entire
attack scenario.
1Specifically, our ruleset audits execve, read, readv, write, writev, sendto, recvfrom, sendmsg, recvmsg, mmap,
mprotect, link, symlink, clone, fork, vfork, open, close, creat, openat, mknodat, mknod, dup, dup2, dup3,
bind, accept, accept4, connect, rename, setuid, setreuid, setresuid, chmod, fchmod, pipe, pipe2, truncate,
ftruncate, sendfile, unlink, unlinkat, socketpair,splice, init module, and finit module.
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const char∗ o r i g t a r g e t d i r = cnt−>conf . t a r g e t d i r ;
cnt−>conf . t a r g e t d i r = ”/tmp” ;
event ( cnt , EVENT IMAGEDETECTED,
&cnt−>imgs . image r ing [ cnt−>imgs . image r ing out ] , NULL,
NULL,
&cnt−>imgs . image r ing [ cnt−>imgs . image r ing out ] .
t imestamp tv ) ;
cnt−>conf . t a r g e t d i r = o r i g t a r g e t d i r ;
Figure 6.1: Attacker code that copies image frames to a malicious location. event(...) is






Figure 6.2: Attack graph describing the data exfiltration attack on Motion. Audit logs
capture information flows from the video source (/dev/video0) to the expected location
(/images) and the adversary controlled location (/tmp).
Experimental Setup We use the same setup as described in Sec 2.2, running Motion
v4.3.2 using an external USB webcam as a video source. We include ioctl, rt sigprocmask
and gettimeofday in our audit ruleset as these syscalls are used to capture frames from video
devices and maintain video frame rates. Upon running the Ellipsis template generation script
we obtained two templates that describe how Motion (i) captures an image frame and (ii)
captures an image frame describing movement and saves it to the file system.
For this experiment, Ellipsis is configured with templates learned from the benign target
application. We capture system audit logs while the malicious application executes for 5
minutes and introduce movement in the camera’s field of view to trigger writes to both
benign and malicious locations in the system.
Results Ellipsis correctly reduces audit logs that correspond to the capture of image
frames where motion is not detected because that behavior remains unchanged in the mali-
cious application. As the attacker inserts code to copy image frames describing movement,
Ellipsis observes additional occurrences of openat, write and close system calls that differ
from previously observed benign behavior. Therefore, Ellipsis retains all audit logs generated
in response to observed movement in lossless fidelity. As Ellipsis matches only one template
and the attack is ongoing throughout the experiment, we observe only a 25% reduction in
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audit log size with Ellipsis compared to vanilla Linux Audit when the same number of images
are written to disk. However, if the attack was made stealthier by selectively exfiltrating
images of interest, we would have observed close to optimal levels of reduction.
6.2 THROTTLE OVERRIDE ATTACK
We now reproduce an attack on throttle signals on ArduPilot [64] presented in prior
work [71] to show that Ellipsis helps in capturing attack behavior without log loss on resource
constrained systems by aggressively reducing known benign behaviors.
Attack Scenario Autopilot applications such as ArduPilot are responsible for ensuring
the safe operation of unmanned autonomous vehicles such as drones. The autopilot manages
the rotary speed of motors using actuation signals that are periodically updated to ensure a
fast and consistent response required for controlled flight.
Let’s consider a stealthy attacker who wants to destabilize or take over control of un-
manned drones. To achieve this objective, the attacker first gains control of a task on the
system and attempts to override the control signals. A brute force approach of continuously
overriding the actuation signals is not very effective in this case as the computational over-
head of the attack can cause other tasks to miss deadlines, potentially leading to a system
crash. Therefore, the attacker leverages side channel attacks such as Scheduleak [71] dur-
ing the reconnaissance phase of the attack to learn when the control signals are updated.
Armed with this knowledge, the attacker overrides the actuation signals immediately after
the original updates, thus effectively taking control with low overhead.
Experimental Setup We use the same setup described in Chapter 5 and choose the
quadcopter variant of ArduPilot i.e., Copter as the target application, for our experiment.
We use attack scripts provided by authors of Scheduleak [71] to generate override signals on
the same interface as used by Copter to send actuation signals. Furthermore, we configure
the audit subsystem to audit forensically relevant syscalls from the target application and
the attacker controlled task. Ellipsis is configured with 3 templates describing expected
behavior for the Copter application. We execute the attack script for 250 seconds while
Copter is running and capture audit logs for analysis.
Results Overriding throttle control signals involves writing to files in sysfs. This attack
behavior can be observed in audit logs as sequences of openat, write and close syscalls.




Figure 6.3: Attack graph describing the throttle override attack. Audit logs capture benign
information flows from ArduCopter as well as malicious flows from the attacker controlled
process (pwm attack) to the PWM interface.
known templates while reducing expected benign behavior from the Copter application.
Thus, Ellipsis supports lossless auditing throughout the application runtime. In contrast,
vanilla Linux Audit loses audit logs potentially resulting in loss of forensic evidence.
Timing based side channel attacks such as Scheduleak [71] rely on frequent invocations of
the clock gettime system call to infer task activation times. Such system calls are irrelevant
for forensic analysis as they don’t capture critical information flows and are excluded from
audit rules to reduce overheads. Despite the lack of visibility in the reconnaissance phase
of the attack, Ellipsis and Linux Audit can capture evidence of attacker interference that
creates new information flows relevant for forensic investigations as shown in Fig. 6.3.
6.3 SUMMARY
We observe that when a malicious process deviates from the expected behavior of a benign
task, Ellipsis provides the same security as Linux Audit by aborting log reduction and
recording all events. Additionally, Ellipsis all but eliminates the possibility of losing portions
of the malicious activity due to log buffer overflow. However, if the malicious process adheres
to the expected behavior of the benign task, the associated logs will be reduced.
The question, then, is whether the malicious process can perform meaningful work for the
attacker while adhering to the benign template. If Ellipsis exclusively matched against sys-
tem call IDs, such a feat may be possible; however, Ellipsis carefully inspects the arguments
and temporal constraints of each system call when generating templates, making it highly
unlikely that they could match against malicious actions. For example, an attacker might
try to substitute a read from a non-sensitive file with a read from a sensitive file; however,
doing so would require changing the file path argument of an open system call, which would
violate the template. As a result, we argue that Ellipsis provides comparable security to
commodity auditing frameworks at greatly reduced costs. Finally, we note that the origi-
nal contents of the system log can be largely reconstituted. We refer interested readers to
Appendix B for a demonstration.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
System Scope. While the analysis and evaluation are based on specific systems and schedul-
ing policies, it should be noted that Ellipsis is useful for any application that has predictable
repeating patterns. Further any real-time applications that can run on Linux can leverage
Linux Audit and Ellipsis . This does not include safety-critical applications as Linux itself
is not suitable for them.
Log Storage. Auditing can create large volumes of log (§5.2). This is specially concerning for
RTS that have low storage capacity. Linux Audit supports remote log storage with auditd-
remote plugin [72] or rsyslog [73]. However such support does not avoid log loss when the
log buffer overflows (§5.4). Hence Ellipsis is a vital technique to audit RTS without losing
any audit events, regardless of where logs are stored.
External Triggers for Aborting Log Reduction. Ellipsis aborts log reduction when an un-
expected system call behavior is detected, but could also be adapted to support additional
failure conditions. For example, log reduction could be aborted if the scheduler detects a
deadline violation, or if a dedicated fault detection system raises an alert [2, 74].
Ellipsis as an Intrusion Detection Mechanism. Ellipsis compares the runtime behavior of
real-time applications to learned templates; it is interesting to consider the possibility of
Ellipsis templates being used as a security indicator for intrusion detection. As Ellipsis can
detect variations in both timing behavior and system call usage, it may prove an effective
complement to existing RTS intrusion detection mechanisms. For example consider a side
channel attack like Scheduleak [75]. In this attack, the malicious task monitors its runtime
by repeated system calls to get the current time. This behavior can be readily identified
within the audit log and will present as a significant deviation from the template for a task.
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CHAPTER 8: RELATED WORK
System Auditing. Due to its value in threat detection and investigation, system auditing is a
subject of interest in traditional systems. While a number of experimental audit frameworks
have incorporated notions of data provenance [23, 27, 69, 76] and taint tracking [25, 77],
the bulk of this work is also based on commodity audit frameworks such as Linux Audit.
Techniques have also been proposed to efficiently extract threat intelligence from voluminous
log data [24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 49, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84]; in this work, we make
the application of such techniques applicable to RTS through the design of an system audit
framework that is compatible with temporally constrained applications. Our approach to
template generation in Ellipsis shares similarities with the notion of execution partitioning
of log activity [28, 32, 34, 49, 57], which decomposes long-lived applications into autonomous
units of work to reduce false dependencies in forensic investigations. Unlike past systems,
however, our approach requires no instrumentation to facilitate. Further, the well-formed
nature of real-time tasks ensures the correctness of our execution units (i.e., templates).
Forensic Reduction. Significant effort has been dedicated to improving the cost-utility ratio
for system auditing by pruning, summarizing, or otherwise compressing audit data that is
unlikely to be of use during investigations [51, 52, 58, 77, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88]. Of these,
Ma et al.’s KCAL [37] and ProTracer [25] systems are among the few that, like Ellipsis ,
inline their reduction methods into the kernel. Regardless of their layer of operation, these
approaches are often based on an observation that certain log semantics are not forensically
relevant (e.g., temporary file I/O [88]), but it is unclear whether these assumptions hold
for cyber-physical environments. For example, KCAL would reduce multiple identical read
syscalls to a single entry. However, a large number of extra reads may be cause deadline
misses in an RTS and hence should not be reduced for RT applications under audit. To our
knowledge, Ellipsis is the first system to explicitly address the challenges of auditing RTS.
Auditing RTS. Although auditing has been widely acknowledged as an important aspect of
securing embedded devices [39, 40, 41], challenges unique to auditing RTS have received only
limited attention. Wang et al. present ProvThings, an auditing framework for monitoring
IoT smart home deployments [89], but rather than audit low-level embedded device activity
their system monitors API-layer flows on the IoT platform’s cloud backend. Tian et al.
present a block-layer auditing framework for portable USB storage that can be used to
diagnose integrity violations [90]. Their embedded device emulates a USB flash drive, but
does not consider system call auditing of real-time applications. Wu et al. present a network-
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Table 8.1: Comparison of Event Tracing Systems
Features →







Linux Audit [92] Forensic Analysis 3 7 3
C’Mon [2] Fault Detection 3 7 -
VxWorks [4] Event Tracing 3 7 -
QNX [3] Event Tracing 3 7 -
Zeno [93] Temporal Provenance 7 7 7
Feather-Trace [36] Event Tracing - 7 -
Ellipsis Forensic Analysis 3 3 3
layer auditing platform that captures the temporal properties of network flows and can
thus detect temporal interference [91]. Whereas their system uses auditing to diagnose
performance problems in networks, the presented study considers the performance problems
created by auditing within real-time applications. In contrast, our work directly addresses
the challenges of RTS auditing by incorporating the audit system into the real-time task
schedule.
8.1 COMPARISON OF EVENT LOGGING SYSTEMS FOR RTS
While, to the best of our knowledge, there are no existing systems that address RTS
Security Auditing, we present a comparison of related event tracing systems, as summarized
in Table 8.1.
Application Agnostic. Linux, Ellipsis , C’mon, VxWorks and QNX are fully integrated into
their respective systems and trace system events with no application changes. Feather-Trace
events can be inserted in syscall path to trace them, though such support does not currently
exist. Lack of support for ARM architectures also limits the applications that can utilize
Feather-Trace. Zeno is based on Zipkin [94] which relies on application instrumentation.
Log Volume. Only Ellipsis features a log reduction mechanism which is critical for contigu-
ous tracing of frequently occurring events, as required for security auditing of long running
RTS, while minimizing storage and dissemination costs.
Forensic Validity. Linux Audit supports various security compliance standards [44, 95, 96,
97]. Ellipsis modifies auditing source code and thus does not inherit the certifications.
However, Ellipsis maintains the same auditing information, except timestamps and inter-
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process ordering (Refer Appendix B). C’Mon, VxWorks and QNX tracing systems are
capable of tracing user-system interface events but the systems are not intended for security
auditing. Zeno requires application modifications and hence cannot be used for auditing.
Feather-Trace is flexible in what information it can log, however, the feasibility and impact
of gathering large amounts of information using Feather-Trace is unclear.
Overhead. The final point of comparison is the overhead added by the tracing system but
this is made difficult by limited available information. C’Mon system was built for RTS,
having low predictable overheads. On a 2.4 GHz Intel i7-2760QM machine the average per
event overhead was evaluated to be 1.3 µs. We could not find any publicly available infor-
mation about temporal overheads of VxWorks and ONX tracing. Wu et al. provide latency
impact of Zeno on macrobenchmarks suitable to their usecase. However, a direct inference
of per event overhead is not available. Brandenburg and Anderson designed Feather-Trace
to have exceptionally low overheads, with only one instruction added to events that are not
traced and 61 instructions to added to traced events.
Linux Audit, Ellipsis and Ellipsis-HP share similar behaviors in per event overheads
(§5.5). On our embedded platform (§2.2), syscalls that are not audited incur minimal over-
heads (avg. 0.8 µs, max. 1.0 µs, Fig. 2.2 filtered scenario). The larger latency to audited
syscalls (avg. 27 µs, Fig. 2.2 audit scenario) is due to the rich information captured by Linux
Audit that is critical for forensic analysis. For brevity, we now provide short summary of
some additional experiments. Analyses of audit information generated by Linux Audit and
Ellipsis could detect RTS relevant attacks used in prior works in literature [54, 75]. We then
modified Linux Audit to record minimal information on each syscall i.e., syscall number and
timestamp (For comparison, Appendix B contains complete original Linux Audit entries).
These changes reduced the average latency overhead to 12 µs. While the latency reduction
is desirable, these changes compromised the ability to detect the attacks. The higher over-




This work presents an analysis of Linux Audit and proves its suitability for use in RTS.
Ellipsis is a novel log reduction system that exemplifies the synergistic application aware
co-design of security and fault analysis mechanisms for RTS. The analysis and the devel-
opment of Ellipsis allows real-time applications to be audited while meeting the temporal
requirements of the application. The role of auditing in securing real-time applications can
now be explored further. Similarly, other security mechanisms from general purpose systems
warrant a deeper analysis and redesign for their use in RTS.
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APPENDIX A: TEMPLATES FOR ARDUPILOT
Thread/Task arducopter ap-rcin ap-spi-0
Syscall Count 14 16 1
Expected runtime (ns) 1303419 671567 0

































Table A.1: Columns of this table describe the content of three template files for ArduCopter.
We identified three templates in ArduPilot using the template generation process defined
earlier (§3.2). System call numbers and their corresponding arguments, a0 - a4, were ex-
tracted from the audit logs. read, write, pread64 have system call numbers 3,4 and 180
respectively. Argument values of -1 and temporal constraint values of 0 denote that these
arguments are ignored. 4:3:-1:1:-1 then indicates a write syscall with a0 as 3, a2 as 1. a1 and
a3 are not forensically relevant. Table A.1 describes the complete templates. An execution
sequence matching a template is reduced to a single line in the audit logs at runtime as
shown in the following example
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391356 :5893330) : arch=40000028
per=800000 template=arducopter rep=10 st ime=1601405431589320747
etime=1601405431612287042 ppid=1208 pid=1261 t i d=1261 auid=1000 uid
=0 gid=0 euid=0 su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0 tty=pts0 s e s=3
comm=”arducopter ” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin /
arducopter ” key=(nu l l )
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APPENDIX B: LOG RECONSTRUCTION
This section shows how information can be constructed back from Ellipsis output. It also
notes what specific information is lost in the compression decompression process. For sake
of brevity this example shows a simplified stencil of length 3 and only considers Ellipsis .
Let’s assume that three events are recorded at runtime that would have generated the
following log without Ellipsis :
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391356 :5893330) : arch=40000028
s y s c a l l=4 per=800000 suc c e s s=yes e x i t=8 a0=3 a1=126aa4 a2=1 a3=3
items=0 ppid=1513 pid=1526 t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0
su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0 tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”arducopter
” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin / arducopter ” key=(nu l l )
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391366 :5893333) : arch=40000028
s y s c a l l=4 per=800000 suc c e s s=yes e x i t=7 a0=4 a1=126ab0 a2=1 a3=3
items=0 ppid=1513 pid=1526 t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0
su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0 tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”arducopter
” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin / arducopter ” key=(nu l l )
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391367 :5893334) : arch=40000028
s y s c a l l=4 per=800000 suc c e s s=yes e x i t=7 a0=5 a1=126ab8 a2=1 a3=3
items=0 ppid=1513 pid=1526 t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0
su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0 tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”arducopter
” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin / arducopter ” key=(nu l l )








Ellipsis compresses the three events into a single line as below:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391370 :5893335) : arch=40000028 per
=800000 template=arducopter rep=1 st ime=1601405431612391356 etime
=1601405431612391367 ppid=1513 pid=1526 t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0
euid=0 su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0 tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”
arducopter ” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin / arducopter ” key=(nu l l
)
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Using the template and the compressed line of log, following three lines can be recon-
structed. ∅ denotes values that could not be reconstructed and [min, max] enclose values
for which range is known but not the exact value.
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391356 :∅) : arch=40000028 s y s c a l l=4 per
=800000 suc c e s s=yes e x i t=8 a0=3 a1=∅4 a2=1 a3=∅ i tems=0 ppid=1513 pid=1526
t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d
=0 tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”arducopter ” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /
bin / arducopter ” key=(nu l l )
type=SYSCALL msg=audit ( [1601405431 .612391356 , 1601405431 .612391367 ] :∅) : arch
=40000028 s y s c a l l=4 per=800000 suc c e s s=yes e x i t=7 a0=4 a1=∅ a2=1 a3=∅
i tems=0 ppid=1513 pid=1526 t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 su id=0
f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0 tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”arducopter ” exe=”/home/
pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin / arducopter ” key=(nu l l )
type=SYSCALL msg=audit (1601405431 .612391367 :∅) : arch=40000028 s y s c a l l=4 per
=800000 suc c e s s=yes e x i t=7 a0=5 a1=∅ a2=1 a3=∅ i tems=0 ppid=1513 pid=1526
t i d=1526 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 su id=0 f s u i d=0 eg id=0 sg id=0 f s g i d=0
tty=pts0 s e s=1 comm=”arducopter ” exe=”/home/ pi / a rdup i l o t / bu i ld / navio2 /bin
/ arducopter ” key=(nu l l )
As can be inferred from above, except an audit ID, all information can be reconstructed.
Arguments that were not reconstructed here, were explicitly ignored in the template as they
did not exist or were deemed irrelevant for forensic analysis. Event timings are inexact, but
bounded. The range of uncertainty depends on whether Ellipsis or Ellipsis-HP is being used
and the temporal policy. Each process always has some unmodified audit entries, like exe
from process spawn. Process wide constant entries like PROCTITLE can be reconstructed
based on the audit information from the setup phase of the application. The loss of exact
event timings also loses the exact interleaving of events across different tasks. But real-time
tasks are designed to not have inter-task interference. Further, a successful iteration of the
periodic task which meets its timing constraints has no further negative implications for
future iterations.
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